INTOXICATION AS A DEFENSE IN
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
Arthur Larsont
Intoxication may figure as a defense in workmen's compensation cases within three statutory settings: those containing no
special defenses at all, those having the defense of wilful misconduct, and those specifically making intoxication a defense. The
beginning point in every case, however, must be the same. It is to
ask: what is intoxication?
I
DEFINING INTOXICATION

This question, like the question "what is truth?," is a very old
one, and one that has never received a satisfactory answer. But
when the law sets out to deny compensation on the ground of
intoxication, the matter of definition becomes one of extreme
gravity. Most analysts have ended by delineating several states of
drunkenness, such as the merry, the affectionate, the pugnacious,
the suspicious, the lachrymose, the somnolent, and, finally, the
out-cold state. Such subtle and fascinating gradations are, however,
of little help when one has to interpret a rule or statute under
which a person either is intoxicated or is not.
Several points are well established. Proof of intoxication does
not follow from evidence of any one of the following: that the
claimant had had a few drinks,' that there was a smell of liquor on
t Professor of Law and Director, Rule of Law Research Center, Duke University. B.A.
1931, Augustana College; B.C.L. 1935, M.A. 1938, D.C.L. 1957, Oxford University.
' King v. Alabam's Freight Co., 38 Ariz. 205, 298 P. 634 (1931); American Cas. Co. v.
Jones, 224 Ark. 731, 276 S.W.2d 41 (1955) (death of salesman from collision with parked
bulldozer not solely occasioned by intoxication, although he had consumed five cans of
beer); General Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Corp. v. Prescott, 80 Ga. App. 421, 56 S.E.2d 137
(1949) (employee credited with consuming "a large quantity of liquor"); Parks v. Maryland
Cas. Co., 69 Ga. App. 720, 26 S.E.2d 562 (1943).
In Trent v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp., 178 So.2d 470 (La. App. 1965), the decedent,
a football coach, was killed while driving to observe a football game. He and two other
coaches drank a pint of whiskey, amounting to about two drinks each, before beginning the
trip. The other coaches followed the decedent in another car, and although they could not
see him once he began to drive, they stated that when he left he appeared to be in control of
his faculties. Another motorist stated that before the accident the decedent's car was weaving
back and forth across the road. The court held that the defendant had failed to establish the
defense of intoxication.
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the claimant's breath,2 that he had in his possession a partially
empty bottle of whiskey,3 or that he enjoyed a general reputation
as a heavy drinker. 4 But a combination of some of these, particularly if supported by evidence of the conduct of an intoxicated
man, may establish intoxication. It is not, however, necessary to
meet the extreme test laid down in the well-known quatrain:
He is not drunk who from the floor
Can rise again and drink some more;
But he is drunk who prostrate lies
And cannot drink and cannot rise.
For example, in Lee v. Maryman,5 there was evidence that a
truck driver had been drinking, that his breath smelled of liquor,
that he whooped and hollered and attempted to urinate from the
running board of his truck and drive the truck at the same time.
The court thought this added up to intoxication, and observed that
In Corso v. Tandy & Allen Associates, 10 App. Div. 2d 741, 197 N.Y.S.2d 510 (3d Dep't
1960), the claimant consumed 12 shots of gin but could not keep them down. The use of gin
was to minimize the pain of coronary thrombosis, and the vomiting minimized the effect of
the gin. Compensation was awarded.
See Coonce v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 228 S.W.2d 825 (Mo. App. 1950).
2 United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Davis, 99 Ga. App. 45, 107 S.E.2d 571 (1959). In
Davis, a witness testified that the decedent "was not drunk" but had an odor of alcohol. The
workman had purchased a pint of whiskey and consumed some beer with his meal. A onethird-full bottle of whiskey was found at the scene of the accident. Earlier, the employee had
complained of fatigue and illness. The court felt that the circumstantial evidence could also
sustain a finding that the accident had been caused by sickness and lack of sleep. To find that
the decedent was intoxicated, and to further find that the accident was caused by this
intoxication, "would constitute pyramiding an inference on an inference." Death benefits
were awarded.
See Parks v. Maryland Cas. Co., 69 Ga. App. 720, 26 S.E.2d 562 (1943); Hopwood v.
Pittsburgh, 152 Pa. Super. 398, 33 A.2d 658 (1943).
3 King v. Alabam's Freight Co., 38 Ariz. 205, 298 P. 634 (1931); see United States Fid. &
Guar. Co. v. Davis, 99 Ga. App. 45, 107 S.E.2d 571 (1959).
In Van Note v. Combs, 24 N.J. Super. 529, 95 A.2d 12 (App. Div. 1953), the caretaker
of a stable tripped and fell while climbing down from a hay loft where he had gone to sleep.
Under a "sole-cause" statute (see notes 77-84 and accompanying text infra), a half-empty wine
bottle was held insufficient evidence to establish intoxication, even coupled with the
claimant's own statement that he had "had too much to drink." See Traders & Gen. Ins. Co.
v. Scott, 189 S.W.2d 633 (Tex.Civ. App. 1945).
32, 121 N.E. 182 (1918).
' Lefens v. Industrial Comm'n, 286 Ill.
5 191 So. 733 (La. App. 1939); accord, Montange v. C.A. Wagner Constr. Co., 66 S.D.
48, 278 N.W. 176 (1938) (denying compensation on evidence that claimant had had from
two to six drinks of moonshine, acted drunk, and lost control of his truck).
In Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Hodges, 108 Ga. App. 474, 133 S.E.2d 406 (1963), the
employee was seen drinking from a pint of "bonded" whiskey at lunch time, a bottle of
"shine" liquor at 3 p.m., several cans of beer in the afternoon, and a can of beer at 5:30 p.m.
He was fatally injured in an automobile accident at 6:28 p.m. Witnesses noted the employee's
"thick-tongued" condition prior to the accident. Compensation was denied.
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a man did not have to reach the stage of insensibility to qualify as
drunk under the statute.
Evidence of blood or brain alcohol content is admissible 6 and is
the most objective evidence possible on the issue of intoxication.
Although stated percentages of alcohol presence may not be conclusive proof of intoxication because individuals differ in their
ability to absorb and eliminate the poison before it affects the
brain, it has been held in New York that "when anyone, without
regard to the breadth of his drinking experience, has achieved a
'three-plus' content of alcohol in the brain tissues, he is
17
intoxicated.
In Smith v. State Roads Commission,8 the Maryland Court of
Appeals held that the presence of 0.27 percent alcohol in the
blood, shown by autopsy, was proof of intoxication. The court
observed that in Maryland drunken driving prosecutions 0.15
percent is prima facie evidence that the defendant was under the
influence of intoxicating liquor.9 The doctor in Smith testified that
the presence of 0.27 percent alcohol in the blood would indicate
that the person was highly intoxicated, and that many people "pass
out" at this level. He said that this amount of alcohol amounted to a
pint of one hundred proof whiskey.' 0
Although evidence of blood alcohol level is an increasingly
common feature of death cases presenting the intoxication defense,
there are so many variables in these cases, including the decedent's
own capacity, the presence or absence of other indicia of
6 J.H. Rose Trucking Co. v. Bell, 426 P.2d 709 (Okla. 1967). At the trial, evidence was
excluded as to the percentage of alcohol in the decedent's blood. This was held error on the
ground that the removal of a blood sample from the body without authorization is not in
contravention of the state constitutional provision against self-incrimination.
But cf. R.W. Rine Drilling Co. v. Ferguson, 496 P.2d 1169 (Okla. 1972). Results of a
blood test taken to determine intoxication pursuant to a statute governing motor vehicle
operation were held inadmissible in a workmen's compensation case, since the statute
specifically provided that the results of such a test could not be used as evidence in a "civil
action."
7 Swanson v. Williams & Co., 278 App. Div. 477, 479, 106 N.Y.S.2d 61, 63 (3d Dep't),
aff'd, 304 N.Y. 624, 107 N.E.2d 96 (1951). In Swanson, it was found, nevertheless, that this
admitted intoxication was not the sole cause of the injury. See note 77 infra.
8 240 Md. 525, 214 A.2d 792 (1965).
9 MD. ANN. CODE art. 35, § 100(a)(3) (1957 & Cum. Supp. 1965). For a New York case
citing a similar statute, see Calka v. Mamaroneck Lodge B.P.O.E., 285 App. Div. 1093, 139
N.Y.S.2d 316 (3d Dep't 1955). The blood of the Elks' steward who was killed in an auto
accident had an alcoholic content of 0.29%. The Vehicle and Traffic Law declares that
0.15% alcohol content in the blood is prima facie proof of intoxication. N.Y. VEH. & TeAF.
LAW § 70(5) (McKinney 1965). Compensation was denied.
10 240 Md. at 530, 214 A.2d at 794.
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intoxication," the contribution of other causal factors in producing
the accident, and the wide range of degrees of causal relation of
the intoxication to the accident required by state statutes, that the
cases emphatically cannot be lined up on either side of some
percentage figure with any expectation that those above the figure
will be noncompensable and those below compensable. Nevertheless, it may be useful at this point simply to list the reported cases in
which percentage figures for blood alcoholic content have been
involved, if only to show the variety of results that have emerged
even within single jurisdictions.
In New York, where intoxication is a defense only when it is
the sole cause of the injury, 12 the reported appellate cases show one
award involving blood alcohol level of 0.35 percent,' 3 one of 0.34
percent,14 two of 0.32 percent,' 5 one of 0.31 percent,' 6 three of
"three-plus,"' 7 three of 0.29 percent,'3 two of 0.21 percent,' 9 0.15
11Industrial Indem. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 108 Cal. App. 2d 632, 239 P.2d
477 (1952). Blood tests taken of the decedent led the expert witness to testify that the
decedent must have been "dead drunk," "gutter drunk," and semi-conscious at the time of
the accident. But his wife testified that he was not drunk, and the court held this a sufficient
conflict of evidence to affirm the commission's award.
12 See notes 77 & 78 infra.
Barrett v. Al Charyn, Inc., 13 App. Div. 2d 863, 214 N.Y.S.2d 533 (3d Dep't), aff'd,
I1 N.Y.2d 849, 182 N.E.2d 282, 227 N.Y.S.2d 673 (1962). The cause of death here was
asphyxiation from a charcoal heater used for warming the interior of a panel truck.
14 May v. Accident & Cas. Ins. Co., 276 App. Div. 1043, 95 N.Y.S.2d 687 (3d Dep't
1950). In May, it was found that the presence of 0.34% alcohol content in the brain was
adequate to produce "intoxication, 'impaired senses, disturbed equilibrium, staggering
gait.'" Id. Nevertheless, intoxication was not the sole cause, and compensation was awarded
for the death of a tavern fire tender who had apparently fallen down stairs.
'5 Smyth v. Pinkerton Nat'l Detective Agency, 4 App. Div. 2d 726, 163 N.Y.S.2d 442
(3d Dep't 1957). The employee, a night guard at an industrial plant, was found crushed to
death between the steering wheel of an electric lifting machine and a conveyor belt. In
McKenna v. Atlas Contractors Equip. Corp., 275 App. Div. 876, 88 N.Y.S.2d 668 (3d Dep't
1949), rev'd, 300 N.Y. 317, 90 N.E.2d 479 (1950), the employee, a night watchman, was
killed in a fire in a shanty provided by the employer.
" Brame v. Alcar Trucking Co., 31 App. Div. 2d 881, 297 N.Y.S.2d 378 (3d Dep't
1968); see note 77 infra.
17 Swanson v. Williams & Co., 278 App. Div. 477, 106 N.Y.S.2d 61 (3d Dep't),aff'd, 304
N.Y. 624, 107 N.E.2d 96 (1951); Shannon v. American Can Co., 278 App. Div. 546, 107
N.Y.S.2d 1 (3d Dep't), leave to appeal and rehearingdenied, 303 N.Y. 1016, 102 N.E.2d 841
(1951) (employee's tractor-trailer collided with vehicle left standing on blocks in dark street);
Malloy v. Cauldwell Wingate Co., 284 App. Div. 798, 135 N.Y.S.2d 445 (3d Dep't 1954),
affd, 308 N.Y. 1031, 127 N.E.2d 867 (1955) (decedent night watchman found on employer's
premises dead from skull fracture and inter-cranial injuries).
"8Cliff v. Dover Motors, Inc., 11 App. Div. 2d 883, 202 N.Y.S.2d 914 (3d Dep't 1960),
afl'd, 9 N.Y.2d 891, 175 N.E.2d 831, 216 N.Y.S.2d 703 (1961). An autopsy disclosed 0.291%
alcoholic content in the brain of the deceased salesman. He was killed when the demonstration automobile that he was driving left the road and struck a utility pole. The court
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percent,20 and 0.146 percent.2 1 With these may be compared
denials in two cases, one at 0.30 percent 2 2 and one at 0.29
percent.2 3
Minnesota has one reported case of an award when the level
was "three-plus, 2 4 and one of a denial at a level of 0.2858
percent.25
Among other states, there may be found a Wisconsin award at
0.29 percent, 26 a Colorado award at 0.195 percent, 27 a Missouri
award at 0.175 percent, 28 and Arizona awards at 0.19 percent and
0.10 percent. 29 Reported denials include one from Maryland at
confirmed board findings that intoxication was not the sole cause of the accident. See Post v.
Tennessee Prod. & Chem. Corp., 19 App. Div. 2d 484, 244 N.Y.S.2d 389 (3d Dep't 1963),
aft'd, 14 N.Y.2d 796, 200 N.E.2d 213, 251 N.Y.S.2d 213 (1964); note 77 infra.
In Barker v. General Motors Corp., 5 App. Div. 2d 1031, 173 N.Y.S.2d 42 (3d Dep't
1958), a millwright was found fatally injured by a fall from a roof. The defense of sole
causation by intoxication was not pressed on appeal.
" Skinner v. Tobin Packing Co., 24 App. Div. 2d 785, 263 N.Y.S.2d 719 (3d Dep't
1965), aft'd, 18 N.Y.2d 738, 221 N.E.2d 172, 274 N.Y.S.2d 347 (1966) (employee's body
found in overturned automobile); Van De Water v. Emmadine Farms, Inc., 18 App. Div. 2d
1119, 239 N.Y.S.2d 182 (3d Dep't 1963); see note 77 infra.
20 Scott v. George Schaefer & Sons, 3 App. Div. 2d 775, 160 N.Y.S.2d 429 (3d Dep't
1957) (employee's automobile struck rear of tractor-trailer unit left unattended on public
highway).
2' Fonze v. Stuyvesant Oil Burner Corp., 10 App. Div. 2d 761, 197 N.Y.S.2d 496 (3d
Dep't 1960) (0.146% alcohol in decedent's brain not sufficient to find vehicle accident caused
solely by intoxication; compensation affirmed).
22 In Majune v. Good Humor Corp., 26 App. Div. 2d 849, 273 N.Y.S.2d 819 (3d Dep't
1966), the employee was driving a truck which collided head-on with an oncoming vehicle in
the opposite lane. The autopsy evidence, in addition to the 0.30% content of alcohol by
weight, showed stomach distension with about 1000 c.c. of liquid and a strong odor of
aldehyde, indicating rapid ingestion of a large amount of alcohol.
23 Calka v. Mamaroneck Lodge B.P.O.E., 285 App. Div. 1093, 139 N.Y.S.2d 316 (3d
Dep't 1955); see note 9 supra.
24 Olson v. Felix, 275 Minn. 335, 146 N.W.2d 866 (1966); see note 56 infra.
25 Fogarty v. Martin Hotel Co., 257 Minn. 398, 101 N.W.2d 601 (1960). Under a statute
requiring that intoxication be the "proximate cause of the injury" (MINN. STAT. ANN. §
176.021(1) (1953)), the court in Fogarty applied the defense: "When an employee renders
himself so intoxicated that he cannot perform any of the usual duties of his employment."
An expert testified that the deceased had 0.285% alcohol in his blood and "would have
difficulty walking."
26 Hailer Bev. Corp. v. Department of Indus. Labor & Human Relations, 49 Wis. 2d
233, 181 N.W.2d 418 (1970); see note 56 infra.
27 Electric Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 154 Colo. 491, 391 P.2d 677
(1964); see note 57 infra.
28 In McCue v. Studebaker Automotive Sales, Inc., 389 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1965), the
decedent, an automobile salesman, was killed while on his way to meet a prospective
customer. He had been drinking and had a blood alcohol level of 0.175%. It was found that
he still had been performing his duties, even after drinking. Compensation was awarded.
The employer had attempted to show that because of his drinking, the decedent could not
have been in the course of his employment.
29 Peterson v. Industrial Comm'n, 16 Ariz. App. 41, 490 P.2d 870 (1972). Here, the
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0.27 percent,3" one from Kentucky at 0.25 percent, 3 ' and one from
32
Oklahoma at 0.19 percent.
II
INTOXICATION APART FROM STATUTORY DEFENSE

The reported cases in which intoxication has, apart from
special statute, been successfully urged as a defense to workmen's
compensation claims have been based on the theory that, by reaching an advanced stage of intoxication, the claimant has abandoned
his employment, since he has made himself incapable of engaging
in the duties of that employment. A clear example is that of a
chauffeur who became so drunk that the passenger stopped the car
and sent the chauffeur back to the garage from which the car had
been rented. 33 The chauffeur's superior then ordered him to go
home, but the chauffeur was soon after found dead in the garage.
Similarly, a watchman who, after drinking heavily, deliberately
went into a washroom to sleep, was guilty of an obvious abandonment of his employment. 34 Indeed, he probably would have been
out of the course of his employment even apart from the drinking.
And a salesman who became so intoxicated that he fell out of his
car was found by the court to have been so "far gone" that he could
not either physically or mentally have engaged in the duties of his
employment.3 5
On the other hand, if the claimant continues actively to perform his duties, even while admittedly intoxicated, he has not
abandoned his employment. Thus, compensation was awarded to a
coal driver who continued to drive his wagon while intoxicated,
and fell from the seat. 36 Missouri has expressly adopted the
decedent, at a time when his blood alcohol content was 0.19%, suffocated as a result of
getting his head caught between two metal slats of a bed headboard in a rooming house
where he was staying overnight. Compensation was awarded. The court stated that the
Arizona rule required intoxication to reach the point at which it is "tantamount to
abandonment of employment," if it is to be a defense. Id. at 43, 490 P.2d at 872; see Ortega v.
Ed Horrell & Son, 89 Ariz. 370, 362 P.2d 744 (1961) (involving 0.10% level).
30 Smith v. State Roads Comm'n, 240 Md. 525, 214 A.2d 792 (1965).
31 Woosley v. Central Uniform Rental, 463 S.W.2d 345 (Ky. 1971); see note 60 infra.
32 In re Barger, 450 P.2d 503 (Okla. 1969); see note 78 infra.
33 In Emery Motor Livery Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 291 Il. 532, 534, 126 N.E.143,
144 (1920), compensation was denied. The cause of death is not mentioned in the opinion,
except to the extent that it is noted that "death arose out of his drunken condition rather
than out of his employment."
34 John A. Roebling's Sons Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 36 Cal. App. 10, 171 P. 987
(1918).
35 O'Neil v. Fred Evens Motor Sales Co., 160 S.W.2d 774 (Mo. App. 1942).
36 City Ice & Fuel Co. v. Karlinsky, 33 Ohio App. 42, 168 N.E. 475 (1929).
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course-of-employment approach in this class of cases. In awarding
compensation in spite of evidence of considerable drinking and of
"weaving on the highway" prior to the accident, 3 7 the court quoted
the following passage from an earlier case:
[W]e cannot deny compensation because of intoxication, at least unless it
was shown that the degree of intoxication was such that it could be held
that the injury did not arise out of the employment because the employee
could not have been engaged in it. Employers will have to enforce

their rules against drinking by discharging offending employees
or by such other disciplinary measures as they see fit to adopt.38
III
INTOXICATION

AS WILFUL MISCONDUCT

Attempts to treat drinking as "wilful misconduct" under that
statutory defense have been generally unsuccessful, usually for lack
39
of a clear causal connection between the drinking and the injury.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin has rejected the defense on
the basis of a distinction between wilful drinking and wilful
intoxication. 40 This court was confronted with a pair of findings
which on the surface looked inconsistent: that the deceased's fall
from his wagon was not caused by wilful misconduct, but that the
deceased was in an intoxicated condition which proximately caused
the accident. These findings were reconciled by the observation
that a person, although drinking intentionally, may not intend to
become drunk, and yet may become so due to fatigue, hunger, or
illness.
Michigan has ruled that the element of wilfulness can be
negatived by evidence that drinking was the only way the claimant
41
could relieve the pain of compensable injury.
37 Coonce v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 228 S.W.2d 825 (Mo. App. 1950).
38 Id. at 828, quoting Phillips v. Air Reduction Sales Co., 337 Mo. 587, 595, 85 S.W.2d
551, 555 (1935) (emphasis in original).
39 Ginther v. J.P. Graham Transfer Co., 348 Pa. 60, 33 A.2d 923 (1943); see Hopwood
v. Pittsburgh, 152 Pa. Super. 398, 33 A.2d 658 (1943). In Hopwood, a hospital orderly's
drinking on duty in violation of rules and statutes was held not a "violation of statute" under
the Pennsylvania act.
40 Nekoosa-Edwards Paper Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 154 Wis. 105, 141 N.W. 1013
(1913).
41 In Scroggins v. Coming Glass Co., 283 Mich. 628, 172 N.W.2d 367 (1969), the
claimant suffered a compensable back injury and, after surgery, returned to work for the
same employer. He was later discharged for working while drunk, but claimed that his
drinking was the only way he could alleviate the pain resulting from the original injury. The
claimant's intoxication was held not to be wilful misconduct, and an award of benefits
resulting from the claimant's firing was affirmed.
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Kentucky, however, supplies a case illustrating how the extreme character of the facts can support a conclusion that wilful
intoxication constitutes wilful misconduct. 42 The decedent, an attorney, had driven to another city to have a "rehabilitation client"
tested. During the testing, the decedent went to a bar and had
several drinks, and afterwards, in the company of the client, he
spent about two hours in a bar, becoming highly intoxicated. The
decedent permitted the client, an inexperienced driver who did not
have a driver's license, and was somewhat intoxicated, to drive the
car, and the decedent was killed when the car mysteriously left the
road. The court held that the decedent had been guilty of wilful
misconduct in permitting the client to drive the car, and he was
also guilty of wilful intoxication, even though he was not driving
the car.
IV
INTOXICATION

AS A SEPARATE STATUTORY DEFENSE

Thirty-six states make intoxication the basis of a separate
defense, and three others make it a ground for reduction in the
amount of the award. 43 The variation among the statutes appears
almost entirely in the manner in which the requisite causal connection between the intoxication and the injury is described. This
causation requirement ranges from none whatever to sole causation. Most of the statutes state a simple causal relation in such
terms as "injury due to (or caused by, or resulting from)
intoxication. 4 4 A few prefer the somewhat similar phrase "oc12 Banks v. Department of Educ. Bureau of Rehab., 462 S.W.2d 428 (Ky. 1971).
43 COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 81-13-5 (1953) (50% reduction); see Mohawk Rubber Co. v.
Claimants in Death of Cribbs, 165 Colo. 526,440 P.2d 785 (1968). Colorado's 50% reduction
in benefits applies if the "injury" is caused by intoxication. This provision has been held
applicable to death benefits as well as to disability benefits. In Conn v. Conn, 167 Colo. 177,
446 P.2d 224 (1968), the decedent's death was a result of his intoxication. Death benefits
were reduced by 50%.
Idaho, Utah, and Wisconsin have statutes similar to that of Colorado. See IDAHO CODE §
72-208 (1973) (50% reduction); UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-1-14 (1953) (15% reduction except in
death cases); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 102.58 (1973) (15% reduction, not to exceed $7,500).
44 ALA. CODE tit. 26, § 270 (1958); CAL. LABOR CODE § 3600 (West 1971); COLO. REv.
STAT. ANN.

§ 81-13-4 (1963);

CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.

§ 31-284 (1972);

DEL. CODE ANN.

tit. 19, § 2353 (1953); GA. CODE ANN. § 114-105 (1953); IDAHO CODE § 72-208 (1973); IND.
ANN. STAT. § 40-1208 (1965); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 342-015 (1969); LA. REv. STAT. §
23-1081 (1964); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 39, § 61 (1965); N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-1-2 (1960);
R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 28-33-2 (1956); S.D. Comp. LAws. ANN. § 62-4-37 (1967); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 50-910 (1966); UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-1-14 (1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 649
(1967); VA. CODE ANN. § 65-35 (1963); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-4-2 (1973); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 102.58 (1973).
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casioned by" intoxication. 45 Several require that the intoxication be
the "proximate cause,' 46 several the "sole cause, 4 7 one the "primary cause, ' 48 one the "direct cause, ' 49 and one the "whole or
partial cause." 50 Three require proof only that the employee was
intoxicated at the time of injury, 5 1 apparently whether or not the
intoxication had anything to do with the injury.
Naturally, since these varying statutes have to be given their
plain meaning, the cases are somewhat varied too, although it may
be observed that, wherever possible, the courts are inclined to
avoid a forfeiture on the basis of the intoxication defense except
when the defense is clearly made out. 52 Since intoxication is an
affirmative defense, the burden of proof of intoxication and of the
requisite degree of causation is on the employer, 5 3 and when there
is a conflict in the evidence, a finding by the commission that
54
inebriation was not the cause of the accident must be affirmed.
45 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59-10-8 (1953); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-12 (1972); S.C. CODE ANN. §
72-156 (1962).
46 Federal Employees' Compensation Act, 5 U.S.C. § 8102 (1970); IOWA CODE ANN. §
85.16 (1949); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 176.021 (1966); Miss. CODE ANN. § 6998-04 (1952); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 34:15-7 (1959). New Jersey, however, has interpreted its statute to require "sole
and proximate" cause. See note 77 infra.
17 Longshoremen's & Harbor Worker's Act, 33 U.S.C. § 903(b) (1970); ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 81-1305 (1960) ("solely occasioned by intoxication," plus statutory prima facie presumption
that injury did not result from intoxication); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-501 (1964); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 101, § 45 (1964); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-7 (1959); N.Y. WORKMEN'S COMP. LAW §
10 (McKinney 1965).
48 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.09(3) (1966).
49 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § 11 (1970). For a discussion of the element of "sole" cause
as figuring in Oklahoma decisions, see note 78 infra.
50 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 281:15 (1966).
51 NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-127 (1960); NEV. REV. STAT. § 616-565 (1967); TEX. REv. CIV.
STAT. art. 8309, § 1 (1967).
52 General Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Corp. v. Prescott, 80 Ga. App. 421, 56 S.E.2d 137
(1949).
" United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Collins, 231 Miss. 319, 95 So. 2d 456 (1957). In
Douglas Aircraft, Inc. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 303 P.2d 26 (Cal. App. 1956), rev'd, 47
Cal. 2d 903, 306 P.2d 425 (1957), there was evidence that the claimant was intoxicated while
driving a motor scooter. The commission made an award. The intermediate court reversed,
but the supreme court restored the award.
54 In Vandiver v. Watford, 178 So. 2d 195 (Fla. 1965), the decedent, a truck driver,
died in an unwitnessed accident. There was evidence that he had been taking drugs and
alcohol in an attempt to stay awake and that he was speeding. He had driven the truck for an
hour and a half after consuming the alcohol. The deputy commissioner found that the death
was not primarily caused by intoxication, but decreased the award 25% for violation of the
speed limit. The full commission reversed, but the supreme court reinstated the award,
stating that the award was based on substantial, competent evidence.
See also Douglas Aircraft, Inc. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 303 P.2d 26 (Cal. App. 1956),
rev'd, 47 Cal. 2d 903, 306 P.2d 425 (1957).
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A. Intoxication Without Regard to Causation
In Texas, where the defense requires only a showing that the
claimant was intoxicated at the time of the accident, the courts have
held that any discussion of causal connection between the intoxication and the accident is irrelevant. In Texas Indemnity Insurance Co.
v. Dill,5 5 a jury had made two findings: first, that the deceased was
intoxicated, and second, that the intoxication did not contribute to
the injury. The appellate court struck the second finding as immaterial and reversed the compensation award. Under the wording
of the statute, there apparently was no choice. It may be observed
in passing that this type of statute is as foreign to compensation
principle as anything could be. It can only be described as a sort of
special penal prohibition measure applicable exclusively to employees. Other people may be punished for drunkenness by small
fines or a night in jail, but if it can be proved that a workman was
intoxicated when blinded by an explosion on the premises, although he would have been blinded just the same if sober, his
penalty is the loss of compensation rights, not to mention
common-law rights, running into many thousands of dollars. Such
statutes, whether phrased in their present form by inadvertence or
intent, are preposterous, and should be speedily amended before
they work some such staggering injustice.
Intoxication as the Proximate Cause of Injury
The intermediate group of statutes, which look for something
56
resembling ordinary legal causation, have been strictly construed.
When a statute says merely "caused by" or "due to," this can refer
neither to remote cause nor to sole cause. It must mean proximate
cause. When, in addition to the intoxication, the facts have preB.

5 42 S.W.2d 1059 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931), aff'd, 63 S.W.2d 1016 (Tex. Comm. App.
1933).
5' See, e.g., Haller Bev. Corp. v. Department of Indus. Labor & Human Relations, 49
Wis. 2d 233, 181 N.W.2d 418 (1970). The decedent in Haller, a liquor salesman, was killed
when the car he was driving crossed the opposite lane of traffic and struck a bridge. His
blood alcohol level was 0.29%, which led the department to determine that he was "probably
intoxicated." However, the employer's request for a 15% decrease in compensation benefits
for death resulting from intoxication was denied, since no evidence was presented showing a
causal relationship between the intoxication and the fatal accident.
In Olson v. Felix, 275 Minn. 335, 146 N.W.2d 866 (1966), the decedent was found
crushed by his motor grader, with an extremely high blood alcohol content of 0.30%. See
notes 7-32 and accompanying text supra. However, immediately before his death he had
been performing his job in a competent manner. The finding that intoxication was not the
proximate cause of death was affirmed.
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sented a special source of hazard bearing upon the accident, courts
have frequently held that the intoxication was not the proximate
cause. Thus, when there was evidence both that the claimant was
intoxicated and that the wheel of his car had broken, the broken
wheel, not the intoxication, was held to be the "cause" of the
overturn of the car.5 7 When a janitor fell down some cellar steps
while intoxicated, and there was some evidence of snow and ice on
the steps and danger due to lack of a railing, the condition of the
58
steps, not the intoxication, was held the proximate cause. Simi-

larly, when the deceased, after drinking a "large quantity" of
liquor, walked into the side of a moving taxi on a foggy night,5 9
and when an intoxicated claimant's car smashed into a tree at a
time when there was some ice and fog, compensation was
awarded. 60 When an intoxicated sawmill worker was killed by
getting his jacket caught in a shaft, it was held that the employer
had failed to prove that the intoxication was the "proximate" cause
51 Evans v. Louisiana Gas & Fuel Co., 19 La. App. 529, 140 So. 245 (1932); accord,
Electric Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 154 Colo. 491, 391 P.2d 677 (1964). The
claimant's intoxication does not affect the question of whether the accident was one arising
out of and in the course of his employment. Rather, the effect of intoxication under
Colorado law is to reduce benefits by 50%. There was evidence that the decedent in Electric
Mutual had a blood alcohol level of 0.195%, but this was held not to affect the size of the
benefits, since the accident was caused by a malfunction in the automobile. Id. at 495, 391
P.2d at 679.
In Stephens v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 116 Ga. App. 15, 156 S.E.2d 100 (1967), a
finding that a wreck was caused by lights ceasing to function while the claimant was traveling
60-65 miles per hour in a 50 miles per hour zone was held not to support a conclusion that
the injury was proximately caused by the claimant's intoxication.
58 State ex rel. Green v. District Court, 145 Minn. 96, 176 N.W. 155 (1920).
59 General Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Corp. v. Prescott, 80 Ga. App. 421, 56 S.E.2d 137
(1949).
60 Lamb v. Standard Oil Co., 250 la. 911, 96 N.W.2d 730 (1959) (medical expert testified that blood test showed 196 mg. alcohol per 100 c.c. of blood, indicating decedent's
intoxication). Contra, Woosley v. Central Uniform Rental, 463 S.W.2d 345 (Ky. 1971). In a
case of first impression, the Woosley court held that the statutory provision denying compensation in cases of injury or death "caused by ... intoxication" meant that intoxication must
be a proximate cause of the injury or death. Id. at 347. In Woosley, the decedent was killed in
an unwitnessed accident,- driving a truck over a winding, hilly road in wet weather conditions. The truck went off the road on a bad curve on a hill. The decedent had a blood
alcohol level of 0.25%. The court held that there could be more than one proximate cause of
an accident, and benefits could be denied even if the hazardous driving conditions contributed to the accident, as long as the accident would not have happened but for the
intoxication. The court stated that since a truck does not ordinarily run off the road if a
driver is exercising due care, a rebuttable presumption arose that the accident was the result
of the driver's negligence. Id. When the additional fact of high blood alcohol level was
added, the presumption was enlarged to include a determination that the bad driving
resulted from intoxication, and in the absence of conflicting or rebutting testimony no
benefits could be paid. A finding in this case that the death was due to intoxication, and
therefore not compensable, was supported by the evidence.
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of the accident. 6 1 In another case involving a typical hazard of the
employment, compensation was awarded for the death of a drunk
employee who was killed by the fall of a log from a log truck.6 2 The
employment hazard may also be a co-employee, and it has been
held that an injury is not "caused by" intoxication when an intoxicated claimant's verbal abuse prompted a co-employee to assault
him.6 3 The court specifically pointed out that the word "caused" in
the statute meant proximately caused by the intoxication, as when a
workman attempts to operate machinery when drunk.6 4
Georgia has gone even further in narrowing the concept of
causation by intoxication, by holding in Bullington v. Aetna Casualty
Co. 65 that it does not include direct medical causation. The decedent in Bullington had had a moderate drinking problem before his
accident, but it was found that due to a combination of his pain,
enforced idleness, and apprehension of surgery, the drinking problem was aggravated, and resulted in his death from alcoholic
gastritis. The court held that the defense of intoxication was not
applicable, because even though intoxication was the medical cause
of death, it was not the cause of the accident. But New York, under
its "sole cause" statute, 66 has reached the opposite result as to death
from pulmonary edema and acute alcoholism after a Christmas
party drinking contest. 6 7 This difference in result cannot be accounted for by difference in statutory wording. The Georgia statute says: "No compensation shall be allowed for an injury or death
0' Shiplett v. Moran, 58 Ga. App. 854, 200 S.E. 449 (1938).
62 In Smith Bros. v. Dependents of Cleveland, 240 Miss. 100, 126 So. 2d 519 (1961), the
deceased employee was laid off work for the remainder of the day because he was drunk,
but was ordered to park his log truck before leaving. The employer contended the fatal
accident occurred when the employee as a result of intoxication and contrary to orders
attempted to unload the logs. The court held that the employers, who were 150 yards away,
would have heard him trying to remove logging chains and concluded that an unsecured log
fell when the decedent was passing the truck. Id. at 520-21.
63 Conley v. Travelers Ins. Co., 53 So. 2d 681 (La. App. 1951).
64 Id. at 683.
63 122 Ga. App. 842, 178 S.E.2d 901, rev'd on other grounds, 227 Ga. 485, 181 S.E.2d 495
(1971). The court further held that the proper test to apply to the employer's defense was
the "intentionally self-inflicted injury test." Id. at 844, 178 S.E.2d at 903. The court then
adopted what it described as the "Arizona test" for compensable suicides, holding such a
death compensable if the suicide, or alcoholic problem, resulted from the decedent's
becoming devoid of normal judgment. Id. As to the suicide test, see IA A. LAaSON, THE LAW
OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION §§ 36.20, .21 (1973).
66 See notes 77-84 and accompanying text infra.
67 Herman v. Greenpoint Barrel & Drum Reconditioning Co., 9 App. Div. 2d 572, 189
N.Y.S.2d 353 (3d Dep't 1959), aff'd, 8 N.Y.2d 880, 168 N.E.2d 721, 203 N.Y.S.2d 922
(1960); cf. Munsie v. Di Fiore, 19 App. Div. 2d 916, 243 N.Y.S.2d 988 (3d Dep't 1963)
(compensation awarded for death due to delirium tremens caused by trauma of industrial
accident and aggravated by intoxication).
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..due to intoxication. .".. -68 The New York language is: "[T]here
shall be no liability for compensation under this chapter when the
injury has been solely occasioned by the intoxication of the injured
employee while on duty ... ."69 The Georgia interpretation can be
defended by stressing the commonly accepted meaning of "intoxication." Note that the statute does not use such terms as "excessive
drinking" or "use of alcohol." The dictionary definition of "intoxication" is: "The action of stupefying with a drug or alcoholic liquor
...
.,"70 The employee's death in the Georgia case was not "due to"
his being stupefied, but was due to his being made ill by alcohol. As
to the New York decision, it should be stressed that the denial was
primarily based on lack of work connection, with the intoxication
defense merely added as a makeweight.
The intoxication which produces the injury must be that of the
employee himself. Thus, when the accident occurred because of
the intoxication of the employee's wife, who was driving him on a
business trip, the defense was held inoperative, although he himself was dead drunk at the time. 7 1 Similarly, when employees riding
a truck driven by an intoxicated foreman were themselves drunk,
they were held entitled to compensation when the truck hit a
tree. 2 But when the direct cause of the accident was the fact that a
salesman, who had fallen asleep after heavy drinking, fell against a
customer who had taken over the driving of the car and caused
him to lose control, compensation was denied.7 3
In another of the rare denials in this area, an employee "in a
state of intoxication where he was practically helpless" was placed
by the employer near a basement stairway--"a place of safety had
he remained there." The intoxication was held the proximate cause
of his fall down the stairs.74 Here, in at least one view, the accident
was a solo performance, with no distinctive or special employment
68 GA. CODE ANN.

§ 114-105 (1973).

69 N.Y. WORKMEN'S COMP. LAW § 10 (McKinney 1965).

70 THE SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1035 (3d ed. 1955). The alternative

meaning of intoxication, "[t]he action of poisoning; the state of being poisoned ....
is
labeled "obsolete, except medical,"(id.) and accordingly should not be attributed to modern
lay legislators.
71 Industrial Indem. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 108 Cal. App. 2d 632, 239 P.2d
477 (1952).
7'2 Allison v. Brown & Horsch Insulation Co., 98 N.H. 434, 102 A.2d 493 (1954).
7' Compare Klein v. Maryland Cas. Co., 79 Ga. App. 560, 54 S.E.2d 277 (1949); see
Banks v. Department of Educ. Bureau of Rehab., 462 S.W.2d 428 (Ky. 1971) (compensation
denied); note 42 supra.
71 Fogarty v. Martin Hotel Co., 257 Minn. 398, 101 N.W.2d 601 (1960) (alleged
negligence of employer held immaterial).
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factor, such as ice, fog, elevator doors, or falling logs, involved in
bringing on the accident. The mere presence of the stairs was a
passive and normal part of the environment. Note that here we are
not concerned with the special compensation rules associated with
the term "arising out of the employment," but with the more
familiar legal term "proximate cause."
Under a statute which requires that intoxication be the "primary" cause, 75 the burden on the defense becomes somewhat
heavier. For example, an intoxicated painter fell through a defective guard rail on a scaffolding, but the defectiveness of the rail was
held the direct cause of the accident, while the intoxication was a
remote cause.7 6
C. Intoxication as the Sole Cause of Injury
The strictest type of statute, which requires a showing that
intoxication was the "sole cause" of the injury, presents an opportunity for a little more controversy than the better-known concepts
of causation in the other statutes. Because of the severe burden of
proof, the majority of attempts to invoke the defense have been
unsuccessful, 7 7 and there have been few denials of compensation,
75 See, e.g., Vandiver v. Watford, 178 So. 2d 195 (Fla. 1965); see note 54 supra.
76 Zee v. Gary, 137 Fla. 741, 189 So. 34 (1939).
7 C.F. Lytle Co. v. Whipple, 156 F.2d 155 (9th Cir. 1946); Maryland Cas. Co. v.

Cardillo, 107 F.2d 959 (D.C. Cir. 1939) (collector robbed and beaten while drunk); see note
79 infra.
In Jones Truck Lines, Inc. v. Letsch, 245 Ark. 982,436 S.W.2d 282 (1969), the claimant,
a truckdriver, ran off the road, suffering injuries. He did not remember the circumstances
surrounding the accident. A doctor testified that pills the claimant was required to take and
an earlier head injury could have contributed to the accident, causing the claimant to
become confused. In addition to the pills, the claimant had been drinking alcoholic
beverages which the doctor stated could have increased the effects of the pills. Intoxication
was held not to be the sole cause of the accident, and compensation benefits were awarded.
In the New Jersey case of O'Reilly v. Roberto Homes, Inc., 31 N.J. Super. 387, 107 A.2d
9 (App. Div. 1954), a few beers in the afternoon, four rye eggnogs in the evening, and
sufficient alcohol content in the brain to affect people different ways did not establish that
intoxication was the sole and proximate cause of death from an automobile accident. New
Jersey had construed its statutory phrase "natural and proximate cause" to mean "sole and
proximate cause." The O'Reilly court said:
As to the matter of intoxication, R.S. 34:15-7 [N.J.S.A.] requires that an
employer, seeking to show intoxication as a defense, demonstrate that it is "the
natural and proximate cause of injury." In Kulinka v. Flockhart Foundry Co., 9 N.J.
Super. 495 (Cty.Ct. 1950), affirmed sub nomine Bujalski v. Flockhart Foundry Co., per
curiam and substantially on opinion below, 16 N.J. Super. 249 (App. Div. 1951),
certification denied 8 N.J. 505 (1952), the court interpreted this statute to mean
"solely" produced by intoxication. (9 N.J. Super. 505.) [sic] See I Larson, supra, secs.
34.33, 34.34, pp. 492, 493.
Thus the New Jersey rule today is that the employer must show intoxication as
a cause to the exclusion of all others.
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even when the intoxication played a substantial part in causing the
Id. at 392-93, 107 A.2d at 12.
Kulinka v. Flockhart Foundry Co., 9 N.J. Super. 495, 75 A.2d 557 (L. Div. 1950),
involved a fall by an employee attempting to enter a crane. The court based its reading of
the statute as requiring "sole" causation on the force of the word "the." The court explained:
Has the respondent shown by the preponderance of all of the evidence in the
record that Kulinka's intoxication was "the natural and proximate cause" of his
injury?
The article "the" in this statutory context is a word of exclusion. It means that
in order to defeat recovery the employer must show by the greater weight of the
evidence that the employee's injury was produced solely by his intoxication. In
other words, the employment must supply no more than the setting, the stage, the
situation in which the fall occurred; it can be no more than an inactive condition as
distinguished from a moving cause. If the hazards or risks which are incidental to
the employment concur with the employee's insobriety in producing the fall or if
the hazards or risks contribute efficiently to the production of the fall, compensation cannot be denied. If the legislature intended intoxication as a concurrent or
contributory cause of an injury to effect a deprivation of the benefits of the statute
it would have been a simple matter to have said so.
Id. at 505, 75 A.2d at 562 (emphasis in original).
Olivera v. Hatco Chem. Co., 55 N.J. Super. 336, 150 A.2d 781 (App. Div. 1959), quoted
both O'Reilly and Kulinka at length as requiring a showing that intoxication was the "sole
producing cause of death" to establish the defense. In this instance, the decedent was struck
by a broken piece of lumber flung out by a whirling centrifuge. The decedent's blood alcohol
content was 0.01634% by weight. See Schultz v. Henry V. Vaughans Sons, 24 N.J. Super.
492, 94 A.2d 873 (L. Div. 1953); note 84 infra.
In New York, the lack of success in invoking the intoxication defense is illustrated by the
following cases. In Cliff v. Dover Motors, Inc., 11 App. Div. 2d 883, 202 N.Y.S.2d 914 (3d
Dep't 1960), aff'd, 9 N.Y.2d 891, 175 N.E.2d 831, 216 N.Y.S.2d 703 (1961), an autopsy
disclosed 0.291% alcoholic content in the brain of the deceased salesman. The court
confirmed the findings of the board that intoxication was not the sole cause of the accident.
In Malloy v. Cauldwell Wingate Co., 284 App. Div. 798, 135 N.Y.S.2d 445 (3d Dep't 1954),
afftd, 308 N.Y. 1031, 127 N.E.2d 867 (1955), compensation was awarded for the death of an
intoxicated night watchman, whose normal post of duties was outside of the building, even
though he was inside the building and death occurred after his hours of duty.
In Bramer v. Laratonda, 8 App. Div. 2d 876, 186 N.Y.S.2d 1001 (3d Dep't 1959), the
claimant was told to quit because he was intoxicated. The court affirmed an award on the
presumption that the injury did not result solely from intoxication. A similar result was
reached in Peer v. East Rochester Exempt Firemen's Ass'n, 281 App. Div. 934, 119"N.Y.S.2d
646 (3d Dep't 1953). There, an intoxicated cook was found face down two feet from a rear
sidewalk. He died of a fractured skull and death was held compensable.
In Brame v. Alcar Trucking Co., 31 App. Div. 2d 881, 297 N.Y.S.2d 378 (3d Dep't
1969), the decedent's truck broke down, and while crossing an expressway to reach a second
truck which had been sent to pick him up he was struck and killed. An autopsy revealed a
0.31% blood alcohol concentration, which would have seriously impaired motor functions,
judgment, and visual perception. However, the testimony of witnesses who had observed the
decedent immediately prior to his death was not produced. A finding that death was not due
solely to intoxication was held supported by the evidence, and an award of death benefits
was affirmed. See Department of Tax. & Fin. v. De Parma, 254 App. Div. 615, 3 N.Y.S.2d
120 (3d Dep't 1938); note 80 infra.
In Post v. Tennessee Prod. & Chem. Corp., 19 App. Div. 2d 484, 244 N.Y.S.2d 389 (3d.
Dep't), aff'd, 14 N.Y.2d 796, 200 N.E.2d 213, 251 N.Y.S.2d 32 (1963), the employee was so
intoxicated that his companions refused to ride with him and considered taking his car keys
from him. A subsequent blood test indicated a 0.29% blood alcohol content. He entered the
wrong side of a divided highway near his home and proceeded a considerable distance with
cars approaching directly at him until the fatal head-on collision. Compensation was

1974]

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION

injury. 78 For example, an intoxicated employee fell off a truck, but
there was evidence that the truck had struck an obstruction and
jolted. Hence, although the employee was off balance because of
his intoxication, the jolt also contributed, and the intoxication could
awarded. The dissent contended that affirming compensation established a precedent that
when an employee is driving a vehicle, his intoxication can never be the "sole" cause of
injury. Id at 489, 244 N.Y.S.2d at 394.
The court in Swanson v. Williams & Co., 278 App. Div. 477, 106 N.Y.S.2d 61 (3d Dep't),
aftd, 304 N.Y. 624, 107 N.E.2d 96 (1951), awarded compensation to an admittedly
intoxicated employee who fell on the stairway of his own home, in part because of a prior
compensable injury which- required him to use crutches. See notes 7 & 16 supra.
In Van De Water v. Emmadine Farms, Inc., 18 App. Div. 2d 119, 239 N.Y.S.2d 183 (3d
Dep't 1963), a milk driver fell out of his truck, fractured his skull, and died. The autopsy
indicated 0.21% alcohol in the blood stream. Since the driver had to stand near the open
door while operating the truck, the additional employment factors supported a finding that
his death was not due solely to intoxication. Compensation was awarded.
See Munsie v. Di Fiore, 19 App. Div. 2d 916, 243 N.Y.S.2d 988 (3d Dep't 1963) (death
from delirium tremens caused by accidental trauma and contributed to by intoxication held
compensable). See also New York cases cited in notes 13-21 supra.
78 For example, in Smith v. State Roads Comm'n, 240 Md. 525, 214 A.2d 792 (1965),
the decedent was killed in a collision with a telephone pole, while driving at night on a wet
road. The fact of intoxication was established by an autopsy showing 0.27% alcoholic content
in the blood. The commission held that intoxication was not the sole cause of the death, but
this was reversed by the trial court, which under Maryland practice, conducts a trial which is
essentially de novo. The trial court decision was affirmed. Maryland requires that intoxication, to be a defense, must be the sole cause, but also creates a presumption that the injury
did not result solely from the intoxication of the injured employee, in the absence of
substantial evidence to the contrary. MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 64 (1957). The court dealt at
considerable length with the argument that other factors, such as the condition of the road,
the darkness and haziness, the excessive speed of the truck, the curves on the road, and
possible oncoming lights or other hazards might have contributed to the accident. Such
speculations and conjectures were held insufficient to ground a finding of cause other than
intoxication. The court said:
Appellant argues that where intoxication and hazards of the employment
concur the claimant must prevail; that Smith, even though intoxicated, was in the
course of his employment and compensation cannot be denied his widow. If
appellant is right, then the Maryland statute is meaningless and we do not agree
that it is meaningless. We agree with the New Jersey court that if the employment
does no more than supply the setting, the stage or the situation in which the injury
occurs, if it is no more than an inactive condition and not a moving cause,
compensation must be denied. Concurrence of intoxication and the setting, alone, is
not enough. There must be in addition, if compensation is to be awarded, some
active or moving or contributing cause.
Id. at 534-35, 214 A.2d at 797 (emphasis in original).
The New Jersey case referred to was Kulinka v: Flockhart Foundry Co., 9 N.J. Super.
495, 75 A.2d 557 (L. Div. 1950); see note 77 supra.
In Majune v. Good Humor Corp., 26 App. Div. 2d 849, 273 N.Y.S.2d 819 (3d Dep't
1966), the decedent was killed in an automobile accident when his car crossed into the
opposite lane and collided head-on with another vehicle. At the time, his blood alcohol was
0.30% by weight. It was unnecessary for the board expressly to negative all possible
contributory factors to reach a finding that intoxication was the sole cause of the accident.
See Calka v. Mamaroneck Lodge B.P.O.E., 285 App. Div. 1093, 139 N.Y.S.2d 316 (3d Dep't
1955); note 9 supra. See also Herman v. Greenpoint Barrel & Drum Reconditioning Co., 9
App. Div. 2d 572, 189 N.Y.S.2d 353 (3d Dep't 1959), aff'd, 8 N.Y.2d 880, 168 N.E.2d 721,
203 N.Y.S.2d 922 (1960); note 67 supra. In Herman, the deceased died of pulmonary edema
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not be said to have been the sole cause of the fall. 9 Similarly, a
window washer who fell after having been drinking was held to
have sustained injury not solely because of his drinking but also
because of the dangerous character of his work.80
This suggests a rather tempting analogy between the degree of
contribution by employment conditions which will render compensable a fall due to epilepsy, 81 and the degree of contribution
which will do the same under a "sole cause" statute for a fall due to
intoxication. It has been submitted by one writer that whenever an
intoxicated workman falls from a stairway or other height, the
employment has contributed to the severity of the injury by placing
him in that dangerous position.82 This conclusion, however, is
contradicted by the cases which have addressed the question. The
Court of Appeals of New York had occasion to express its views in
connection with the claim of a worker who fell from a bridge
girder while intoxicated:
If, in a perfectly safe place, the employee falls because he is
drunk and injures himself, it is clear that the injury results solely
from the intoxication, but it would be unreasonable to deny
compensation only in such cases. Here death was due to the fall
from the bridge girder, but if the fall was due solely to the
intoxication of the employee the case does not come under the
and acute alcoholism several hours after a company Christmas party where he engaged in a
contest with another employee, claiming that he could drink the latter "under the table."
The death was held noncompensable. "The intoxication was the result of excessive personal
use of alcohol which departed from any rational relationship to the work." Id., 189 N.Y.S.2d
at 355. The denial was based primarily on lack of work connection, although the intoxication
defense was also mentioned.
In the Oklahoma case In re Barger, 450 P.2d 503 (Okla. 1969), the' decedent was
involved in an automobile accident and was found to have a blood alcohol level of 0.19%. No
reason other than intoxication was given for the accident. The finding that the decedent's
death -vas not the result solely of intoxication was reversed as not supported by the evidence,
and death benefits were denied. The Oklahoma statute, in creating the intoxication defense,
uses the word "directly" to describe the degree of requisite causation. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
85, § 11 (1970). But later at § 27, the statute says that it shall be presumed, in the absence of
substantial evidence to the contrary, that the injury did not result "solely" from the
intoxication of the employee while on duty. Id. § 27. The court applied a rule, laid down in
Dunaway v. Southwest Radio & Equip. Co., 331 P.2d 365 (Okla. 1958), that a finding of a
0.15% blood alcohol rating was enough to overcome the presumption. Since no other cause
of the accident was shown, and since the presumption was inoperative, the claim failed.
See Collins v. Cole, 40 R.I. 66, 99 A. 830 (1917); note 84 infra.
71 C.F. Lytle Co. v. Whipple, 156 F.2d 155 (9th Cir. 1946); accord, Van De Water v.
Emmadine Farms, Inc., 18 App. Div. 2d 119, 239 N.Y.S.2d 182 (3d Dep't 1963).
80 Department of Tax. & Fin. v. De Parma, 254 App. Div. 615, 3 N.Y.S.2d 120 (3d
Dep't 1938); accord, Maryland Cas. Co. v. Cardillo, 107 F.2d 959 (D.C. Cir. 1939).
81 See 1 A. LARSON, supra note 65, at §§ 12.10-.14.
82 S. HOROVITZ, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 122 (1944).
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act.... If the board reaches the conclusion on the evidence that

Shearer was drunk at a place where if he fell he would probably
be killed and that he fell
owing to his drunkenness, compensa83
tion should be denied.
In Rhode Island, compensation was denied to a night watchman on a dredge who, in pursuance of his duty of rowing members
of the crew to shore, stood up in a small skiff while intoxicated, fell
into the water, and drowned. 4 Here again, it could be argued that
the employment made a contribution to the hazard by placing the
watchman in a dangerous position.
But this line of argument ignores an important distinction
between the epileptic fall and drunken fall cases. In the former, the
conduct of the employee in going upon the girder or getting into
the boat is in itself perfectly proper and reasonable, while in the
latter, the train of causation begins not with the fall, but with
the act of the employee in going onto the girder or getting into the
boat while drunk. By starting the chain of causation at that point, it
is possible to say that the intoxication is the sole cause of the injury.
Moreover, apart from any such technical distinction, most of the
intangible factors which have produced the extremely generous
holdings in the epileptic fall cases are not present here. The
sympathy one is bound to feel for the workman who conscientiously tries to carry on his work in spite of internal weakness or
illness does not carry over to the workman who voluntarily becomes intoxicated on the job. Nor can one say of the drunken
workman, as one says of the epileptic, that the employer takes the
workman as he finds him. He hires a sober workman, who later
makes himself drunk.
D. Employer Participation or Knowledge
Even in a case in which the intoxication defense might otherwise apply, the employer may be estopped to assert it if he helped
to cause the episode. In a California case,85 the general manager,
83 Shearer v. Niagara Falls Power Co., 242 N.Y. 70, 73-74, 150 N.E. 604, 605 (1926); cf.

Swanson v. Williams & Co., 278 App. Div. 477, 106 N.Y.S.2d 61 (3d Dep't), af'd, 304 N.Y.
624, 107 N.E.2d 96 (1951).
84 Collins v. Cole, 40 R.I. 66, 99 A. 830 (1917); cf. Schultz v. Henry V. Vaughans Sons,
24 N.J. Super. 492, 94 A.2d 873 (L. Div. 1953). It was not established in this case that the
employee was intoxicated or that intoxication was the sole or proximate cause of the
accident. The employee had one whiskey and five beers between 11:30 p.m. and 1:30 a.m.
and had been drinking before that. After an unexplained fall, he was found in water near a
gang plank. The death was held compensable.
85 Tate v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 120 Cal. App. 2d 657, 261 P.2d 759 (1953).
A contrary result was reached under the draconian Texas statute, already severely
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who was aware of the deceased's weakness for alcohol, took him to
a bar and later to a tavern, having drinks at both places. The court
adopted the view that when the employer permits intoxication or
other dangerous practices among employees, the results are industrial injuries. The concept of safe place of employment was also
invoked, with the statement that "[t]o send an intoxicated employee
onto a busy highway in a company car is not furnishing him with a
86
safe place to work.
Indiana8 7 and New Hampshire8" have gone further and held
that the employer's knowledge of the intoxication coupled with his
permitting the employee to continue to work in this condition is in
itself sufficient to destroy the defense. Maine, 9 by statutory provision, specifies that intoxication, to be a defense, must be without
the employer's knowledge or consent. But since employer negligence generally is not relevant, so far as compensation liability is
concerned, the mere negligence of the employer in dealing with a
drunk employee does not itself undermine an intoxication defense
that would otherwise be complete. For example, in the previously
noted case in which an employer had allegedly placed the intoxicated employee too close to a basement stairway, the court simply
dismissed the issue of employer negligence as immaterial.9 0
CONCLUSION

Voluntary intoxication which renders an employee incapable
of performing his work is a departure from the course of employment. Otherwise, apart from special statute, evidence of intoxicacriticized (see text accompanying notes 51 & 55 supra), in Smith v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co.,
258 S.W.2d 436 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953). In Smith, the fact that the employer originated and
participated in the drinking did not estop him from asserting the statutory defense. The
employer took the employee with him on a business trip. On the first night, the employer
produced a bottle which they consumed. In addition, the employer and the employee and a
friend drank sufficient whiskey and beer during the evening to become intoxicated. The
employee fell out of a hotel window. The injuries resulting from the fall were held
noncompensable.
86 Tate v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 120 Cal. App. 2d 657, 665, 261 P.2d 759, 764
(1953).
87 In United States Steel Corp. v. Mason, 141 Ind. App. 336, 227 N.E.2d 694 (1967),
the claimant arrived at the job intoxicated and, as a result, was injured. However, the
employer knew of his condition and had allowed him to continue working. It was held that
the employer could not raise the defense of intoxication.
88 Henderson v. Sherwood Motor Hotel, Inc., 105 N.H. 443, 201 A.2d 891 (1964). In
Henderson, the decedent was killed as a result of becoming intoxicated on the job. The
intoxication was held not to be a defense since the employer knew she was intoxicated.
89 ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 18 (1964).

90 Fogarty v. Martin Hotel Co., 257 Minn. 398, 101 N.W.2d 601 (1960).
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tion at the time of injury is ordinarily no defense, at least unless
intoxication was the sole cause of injury. Under the special statutory defense of intoxication, the requisite causal connection between intoxication and injury varies among the statutes all the way
from mere existence of intoxication at time of injury to the requirement that intoxication be the sole cause. To the extent that
there is any room for judicial constriction under these statutes, the
courts will ordinarily (but not invariably) give the intoxication
defense as narrow a scope as the words will bear. This is in line
with the pervading spirit of compensation law and administration,
which minimizes the element of employee fault and maximizes the
element of protecting the security and families of all workers,
including the just and the unjust, the "deserving" and the nondeserving, the prudent and the negligent-yes, and even the sober
and the not-so-sober.

